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United States International Trade Commission:
Co-Equal of the FTC in Regulating Unfair
Methods of Competition
FOREWORD
In the few years since section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 liberalized
the criteria governing the U.S. International Trade Commission's
(U.S.I.T.C.) findings in import relief cases, a number of these cases, involv-
ing such basic commodities as sugar, steel, footwear and televisions, have
received affirmative determinations from the Commission. When viewed
against the backdrop of consistently negative findings by the U.S.I.T.C. in
industry cases brought forward under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
these recent determinations stand out in rather high relief. As a result,
public attention has been turned away from what I feel is a more significant
set of statutory changes. I am referring to the new Act's amendments to sec-
tion 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, dealing with unfair trade practices.
It is important to realize that these amendments are not just modifica-
tions of criteria, as in the case of section 201, but are instead fundamental
clarifications of legislative intent, making what was once considered to be
looked on as a limited set of provisions against patent infringement into a
considerable piece of antitrust legislation, The original section 337 did con-
tain language which could have been interpreted as being antitrust in nature.
However, the U.S. Tariff Commission, the predecessor of the U.S.I.T.C.,
chose to construe the section as applying almost exclusively to patent cases,
and left the larger possibilities of section 337 virtually unexplored.
With the passage of the 1974 Trade Act, amendments to this section
clearly provided for an increased emphasis on the regulation of nonpatent
unfair competitive acts. "Unfair methods of competition," reads 337 (a), as
amended, "and unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United
States, or in their sale . . . the effect or tendency of which is to destroy or
substantially injure an industry efficiently and economically operated in the
United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an industry, or to
restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are
declared unlawful, and when found by the Commission to exist, shall be
dealt with . . . as provided in this section." The instructions of the Senate
Finance Committee Report on the Trade Act of 1974 are absolutely clear:
section 337 is to be considered a statute addressing acts that are anticom-
petitive. I quote: "The Committee believes that the public health and
welfare and the assurance of competitive conditions in the United States
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economy must be the overriding considerations in the administration of this
statute." This language echoes the Act itself, which, in the remedy provi-
sions of section 337, directs the Commission to consider "competitive condi-
tions in the United States economy." Section 337, as amended, provides that
the Commission shall consult with and seek advice and information from
the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. The Finance
Committee Report also notes that these Government agencies will often
have significant information, as well as sound advice, about the impact of
U.S.I.T.C. exclusion or cease and desist orders on the conditions of com-
petition mentioned above. Section 337 (b) (2) enjoins the U.S.I.T.C. to con-
sult with these, and other, agencies during the course of the investigation it-
self. Thus, the Statute leaves no doubt at all as to the Congress' intention
that 337, as amended, be used as a piece of antitrust legislation.
In fact, the 1930 Act is further amended to provide the U.S.I.T.C. with
the necessary tools to use in remedying anticompetitive acts. The harshness
of the prior collection of remedies had greatly limited the usefulness of 337.
The anticompetitive effect of a remedy requiring exclusion of the offending
articles did not, for example, lend the section to proper application as an an-
titrust statute. The new Act has greatly ameliorated this situation by
providing the U.S.I.T.C. with the option of issuing cease and desist orders,
the traditional regulatory weapon of antitrust. The Commission may issue
such orders and may, at any time, upon such notice and in such manner as it
deems proper, modify or revoke them. Thus, it is now feasible to attack an-
ticompetitive actions without using anticompetitive remedies.
The Commission has also sought to fill out its remedy options in such
cases by using consent orders. Implied in statutory powers envisaged in sec-
tion 337 and sanctioned by the Administrative Procedure Act, such orders
were issued by the U.S.I.T.C. in Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, (see
text, infra at note 29). These orders, negotiated by the parties including the
U.S.I.T.C. investigative staff, were taken as the basis for terminating the in-
vestigation. The U.S.I.T.C. has drafted and published for comment
proposed rules for the settlement and termination of investigations by
means of consent orders. It may well be that other remedy provisions will be
found necessary as section 337 provisions are put to greater use. Thus far,
Congressional reaction to U.S.I.T.C. activities under this section would in-
dicate a willingness to provide the U.S.I.T.C. with whatever new remedies
might be necessary to carry out the intent of the Act.
Finally, there has been still another major amendment to section 337,
correcting a large obstacle to the use of the section as an antitrust statute.
Under earlier acts, the U.S.I.T.C. was not subject to provisions of the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act. Its own rules, therefore, contained no provision
for prehearing discovery, and the decisions of the Commission were often
based on confidential information which was not "on the record." The in-
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adequacy of Commission procedures caused one well known antitrust ex-
pert to describe the thought of an antitrust trial at the U.S. Tariff Commis-
sion as "mind boggling." By placing section 337 hearings under the Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, the new statute closed a major procedural gap
and brought the U.S.I.T.C. closer to being a true regulatory agency. For its
part, the U.S.I.T.C. has promulgated new rules, further enhancing the op-
portunities for reasonable antitrust or unfair act proceedings. In addition,
there are now two Administrative Law Judges, before whom hearings are
generally held, and who will then certify the record with their recommenda-
tions to the Commission for its decision.
While it would be incorrect to say that the U.S.I.T.C. has perfected its
procedures, the agency has largely solved the problems of due process which
must be dealt with before complex antitrust cases can be conducted
properly. In my view, the administration of section 337 will be of great im-
portance to the nation over the next decade. I do not believe that the U.S.
International Trade Commission, an independent agency, will necessarily be
bound by precedents set by other regulatory bodies, but that it will establish
its own boundaries, reflecting the unique character of international trade,
and thereby provide a new voice in the world of international antitrust law.
DANIEL MINCHEW




The United States International Trade Commission:




In 1974 Congress passed the Federal Trade Act of 1974,' which, in part,
amended the Tariff Act of 1930.2 The most noticeable effect of the new
legislation was to change the name of the United States Tariff Commission
to the United States International Trade Commission, as the primary
agency empowered under the statute3 (hereinafter U.S.I.T.C.). This name
change was symbolic, for the U.S.I.T.C. assumed increased regulatory
powers under the Federal Trade Act of 1974. In particular, by expanding the
scope of Section 337,4 the U.S.I.T.C. was thrust into a role of regulating
competition in international commerce similar to that enjoyed by the
Federal Trade Commission in proscribing unfair trade practices in com-
merce, generally, pursuant to Section 51 of the Federal Trade Commission
Act.6 Some commentators have suggested that Section 5 of the Federal
* J.D., Universit6 Libre de Bruxelles, Brussels and Emory University; A.B., Vanderbilt-in-
France, Aix-en-Provence, and Duke University; Certificat d'Attendance; Hague Academy of
International Law (1975). Intern, summer 1976, winter 1977, U.S.I.T.C., Office of the General
Counsel, Washington, D.C. Mr. Klayman is a member of The Florida Bar and is associated
with the Miami firm of Blackwell, Walker Gray, Powers, Flick and Hoehl.
1. 19 U.SC. § 2101 (Supp. 1977).
2. 19 U.S.C. § 1337, (1965).
3. 19 U.S.C. § 2231 (Supp. 1977).
4. Section 337(a) of the Tariff Act of 1930 gave the Tariff Commission authority merely to
make recommendations to the President regarding unfair trade practices. This section
provided: -Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into
the United States or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the effect
of or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and
economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an in-
dustry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are delared un-
lawful and when found by the President to exist shall be dealt with in addition to any other provi-
sions of law. as hereinafter provided" (emphasis added).
19 U.S.C. § 1337 (1965 & Supp. 1977) of the Federal Trade Act of 1974 is commonly
referred to as Section 337 (hereinafter Section 337).
5. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1973 & Supp. 1977).
6. Exemplary of the U.S.I.T.C.'s expanded role in regulating international unfair competi-
tion under Section 337 is Subsection (b) which states that: "(i) The Commission shall in-
vestigate any alleged violation of this section on complaint under oath or upon it initiative." 19
U.S.C. § 1337 (b)(i) (emphasis added). As the Tariff Commission, the agency had no such
prerogative.
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Trade Commission Act subsumes Section 337, and hence that U.S.I.T.C.
regulation is unnecessary.'
Section 337, despite its similarity to Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act, has, by granting the U.S.I.T.C. authority to regulate un-
fair trade practices in international trade, while leaving domestic and
foreign commerce generally within the province of the FTC, unquestionably
cast the U.S.I.T.C. as the FTC's co-equal in regulating unfair methods of
competition.
II. JURISDICTION OF THE U.S.I.T.C.
UNDER SECTION 337 OF THE FEDERAL TRADE ACT OF 1974.
A. Jurisdiction Over Property and Persons.
Section 337(a) of the Federal Trade Act of 1974 proscribes unfair
methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of articles into
the United States, or in their sale by the "owner, importer, consignee, or
agent of either.... "8 The Act does not specifically authorize the Commis-
sion to proceed against foreign parties. Since a temporary or permanent ex-
clusion order under Subsections (d) and (e) of section 1337 of 19 U.S.C. are
remedies in rem, the threat of exclusion of the imported articles from the
stream of American commerce is often sufficient inducement to coax a
foreign manufacturer into a U.S.I.T.C. proceeding. Under the procedural
7. Musrey, Tariff Act's Section 337 - Vehicle for the Protection and Extension of
Monopolies. 5. Law & Pol'y. Int'l. Bus. 56, 84 (1973).
15 U.S.C. § 45 provides: "(a)(i) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce, are declared unlawful" (emphasis added).
Section 337 of the Federal Trade Act of 1974 states: "(a) Unfair methods of competition
declared unlawful - Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation ofarticles
into the United States, or in their sale by the owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either, the
effect or tendency of which is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, efficiently and
economically operated in the United States, or to prevent the establishment of such an in-
dustry, or to restrain or monopolize trade and commerce in the United States, are declared un-
lawful. and when found by the Commission to exist shall be dealt with, in addition to any other
provisions of law, as provided in this section" (emphasis added).
While it is true that Section 45's proscription of unfair methods of competition in com-
merce includes the importation of goods that have entered the "stream of American com-
merce," Section 337 is unique in that it: (1) Is addressed solely to the importation of articles
into the United States, thereby carving out an area of expertise for the U.S.I.T.C. in the field of
unfair trade practices; (2) creates a defense to charges of unfair methods of competition by re-
quiring that the complainant's industry be "efficiently and economically operated." 19 U.S.C. §
1337(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977); (3) provides the remedies of a permanent and temporary exclu-
sion order, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1337(d), (e), in addition to a cease and desist order, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(e)
(as in Section 45); (4) sets a one year (or eighteen months in more complicated cases) time
limitation for U.S.I.T.C. investigations, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b); (5) gives the President of the
United States veto power over a U.S.I.T.C. determination, 19 U.SC. § 1337(g). For a recent
case discussing the "Stream of American Commerce" criteria, see note 44, infra.
8. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
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rules to the Federal Trade Act of 19741 an interested party may intervene if
consented to by the Commission. In the absence of intervention, a person
whose valuable property or contract rights are to be adjudicated in an ad-
ministrative proceeding should be joined as a necessary party.'
0 Presently
there is no formal rule granting the Commission authority to join a foreign
manufacturer or exporter as a necessary party to a U.S.I.T.C. investiga-
tion. I
Section 337 has an additional remedy against unfair trade acts in the
cease and desist order.' 2 Because the remedy is in the nature of an in per-
sonam action, if it were applied against a foreign manufacturer, due process
would require his joinder in a U.S.I.T.C. proceeding (in the absence of the
company's intervention).
Commission rules would insure that the foreign manufacturer, as a
respondent, be accorded due process of law by receiving formal notice of the
nature and scope of the Commission's investigation,' 3 have maximum op-
portunity to respond to the allegations of complainant and to participate in
the Commission's investigation,' 4 and be assured of receiving all relevant
documents filed in the course of the Commission's proceeding.'
5
Notwithstanding due process considerations, there are other compel-
ling reasons why a foreign manufacturer should be named as a respondent
to a U.S.I.T.C. proceeding. Primarily, Commission rules'
6 provide that in-
terrogatories may be served only upon parties to the investigation. The
failure or inability to name the foreign manufacturer as a respondent
9. 19 C.F.R. § 210.6.
10. See Consolidated Edison Co. of New York v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197 (1938); NLRB v.
Sterling Elec. Motors, 109 F.2d 194 (9th Cir. 1940): NLRB v. Cowell Portland Cement Co., 108
F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1939).
11. See 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977). In the absence of a statutory provision or
rule a propos the naming of necessary parties, an administrative agency may apply general
procedural rules in making such a determination. See United States v. N.L.R.B., 118 F.2d 486
(3d Cir. 1949); Gibbs v. N.L.R.B., 315 U.S. 797 (1942). Since the U.S.I.T.C. has no rule con-
cerning the naming of individuals or corporations as necessary parties, the Commission may
follow Fed.R.Civ.P. 19. Rule 19(a) lists three criteria in determining whether a person should
be joined in a proceeding as "necessary."
(I) [If] . .. in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already parties,
or;
(2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that the disposi-
tion of the action in his absence may (i) as a practical matter impair or impede his ability
to protect that interest, or;
(3) (ii) leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring dou-
ble, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason of his claimed interest.
12. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
13. 19 C.F.R. § 210.13 (1977).
14. 19 C.F.R. § 210.21 (1977).
15. 19 C.F.R. § 210.33 (1977).
16. 19 C.F.R. § 210.32 (1977).
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deprives the Commission investigative attorney, as well as other parties, of
pre-investigation discovery over the foreign manufacturer or exporter. Ser-
vice of interrogatories on the foreign manufacturer is desirable for the
following reasons: Without an appropriate response to a party's'" in-
terrogatories, it may be impossible to complete pre-investigation discovery
in order to ascertain whether the foreign exporter or manufacturer is an
"owner, importer, consignee or agent of either" and therefore within the
scope of Section 337's regulatory powers.' 8 Service of interrogatories may
also be important because foreign manufacturers who refuse to answer in-
terrogatories (like other parties refusing to answer interrogatories) may
cause such refusals to be construed to be admissions or to be adverse
testimony, documents or other evidence.19
It may also be necessary to name a foreign manufacturer or exporter to
a U.S.I.T.C. proceeding to avoid the risk that the other (American) parties
incur "double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations" as a result of
the foreigner's claimed interest.2 0 Should the Commission issue a permanent
or temporary exclusion order, or demand that the American importer cease
and desist its unfair trade practice(s) pursuant to Section 337, such remedies
might conflict with contracts between American importers and foreign
17. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(i) provides that "[Tlhe Commission shall investigate any alleged
violation of this section or complaint under oath or upon its [own! initiative" (emphasis added).
Parties to Section 337 investigations therefore include "each complainant and respondent in the
investigation, the Commission investigative attorney, and each person designated as a party
pursuant to § 210.6 of this part." 19 C.F.R. § 210.4. Should the U.S.I.T.C. institute an in-
vestigation upon its own initiative it is possible that, absent intervention, it will be the only
complainant to the proceeding. Under the Federal Trade Act of 1974, the Commission has yet
to institute an investigation upon its own initiative.
18. If the foreign manufacturer or exporter is an "owner, importer, consignee, or agent of
either" as defined in 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977), the foregoing argument that he is
a necessary party and must therefore be joined becomes moot. See Certain Welded Stainless
Steel Pipe and Tube, Investigation No. 337-TA-29 (Recommended Determination), (hereinaf-
ter Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube), for argument that foreign manufacturers can often be
classified as owners under the statute.
19. 19 C.F.R. § 210.36. Pursuant to a prehearing order in Certain Above-Ground Swim-
ming Pools, Investigation No. 337-TA-25 (hereinafter Swimming Pool Case), a Japanese swim-
ming pool manufacturer was named as a respondent for the purposes of discovery only (Ad-
ministrative Law Judge reserved right to name manufacturer as full respondent at later date) in
order to facilitate the service of interrogatories.
The argument was advanced that unless the foreign manufacturer was named as a respon-
dent for the purposes of discovery, the U.S.I.T.C. investigation would be severly delayed and
might therefore be unable to meet its one-year deadline, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b). See also, Pre-
Hearing conference in Certain Monolythic Catalytic Converters, Investigation No. 337-TA-18
(hereinafter Certain Catalytic Converters) (U.S.I.T.C. Commissioner Minchew urged that
foreign manufacturer be named as a party in order to avoid delay in implementing discovery).
20. Fed.R.Civ.P. 19(a)(2)(ii).
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manufacturers." The potential therefore exists for a foreign manufacturer
to sue on the contract, possibly before a foreign tribunal.22 Since a foreign
court is more likely to honor a Commission determination to which foreign
manufacturers or exporters have been joined as parties, this possibility pre-




A foreign manufacturer or exporter should also be named as a party to
a U.S.I.T.C. investigation because it is in the public interest. Inclusion of the
foreign manufacturer as a party would encourage the fullest participation of
interested parties and therefore create a forum for the widest possible
presentation of arguments and defenses. 4 A Section 337 proceeding may of-
ten require the naming of the foreign manufacturer as a party because the
foreign manufacturer, or his agent, may be a necessary witness in cases in-
volving infringement of process patents. 5
In sum, for a full adjudication of the parties'2 6 rights and interests un-
der Section 337, it is incumbent that the U.S.I.T.C. have the power to name
a foreign manufacturer or exporter as a party to the investigation.
Notwithstanding intervention by the foreign manufacturer pursuant to
Commission rules,27 the Commission has, in the past, been hesitant to name
a foreign concern as a respondent, absent an affirmative showing that it is
21. See generally United States v. Bayer Co., 105 F. Supp, 955 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); 135 F.
Supp. 65 (S.D.N.Y. 1955); General Aniline & Film Corp. v. Bayer Co., 188 Misc. 929, 64
N.Y.S. 2d 492 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. Co., 1946) affd., 281 App. Div. 668, 117 N.Y.S. 2d 497 (1952),
affd 305 N.Y. 479, 113 N.E.2d 845 (1953) (consent judgment between United States and
respondent had the effect of voiding respondent's contract with third party. Dicta recognized
possible breach of contract action by third party against respondent). See also National
Licorice Co. v. NLRB, 309 U.S. 350, 365 (1946) (breach of contract suit might result from fully
litigated determination as well).
22. See generally Farbenfabriken Bayer v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 307 F.2d 207 (3d Cir. 1962)
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 929 (1963).
23. Fed. R. Civ. P. 19(a) (3) (ii). See generally Kintner, An International Antitrust Primer,
62 (1974).
24, Public interest factors are intended to play a large role in Section 337 proceedings.
Subsection (d) prescribes exclusion of the foreign manufacturer's goods from entry only after:
I(C]onsidering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and welfare, competitive
conditions in the United States economy, the production of like or directly competitive articles
in the United States, and United States consumers, it [U.S.I.T.C.] finds that such articles
should not be excluded from entry."
The Senate Finance Committee has stated that: "ITihe public health and welfare and the
assurance of competitive conditions in the United States economy must be the overriding con-
siderations in the administration of this statute. S. Rep. No. 93-1298, on H.R. 10710, Trade
Reform Act of 1974, 93rd Cong., 2nd Sess. 197 (1974).
25. See discussion of Swimming Pool Case, note 19 supra.
26. 19 C.F.R. § 210.4 (1977) provides: "(b) 'Party' means each complainant and respon-
dent in the investigation, the Commission investigative attorney, and each person designated as
a party pursuant to § 210.6 of this part."
27. 19 C.F.R. § 210.6 (1977).
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an "owner, importer, consignee, or agent of either. ... 1 Recently the
U.S.I.T.C. has taken a bolder approach and has named foreign manufac-
turers and exporters as respondents, apparently in disregard of their
classification under Subsection (a) of Section 337.19
To name a foreign manufacturer to a Section 337 proceeding the Com-
mission must have jurisdiction over his person. In personam jurisdiction
over foreign persons may be asserted under either of two theories.
1. The Territorial Principle.
In the landmark case of American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,30 the
Court held only that a nation hasjurisdiction to prescribe and enforce a rule
of law that relates to conduct within its territory." This rigid concept of
territorial jurisdiction was later expanded by Justice Holmes in Strassheim v.
Daily to include "[A]cts done outside a jurisdiction but intended to produce
and producing detrimental effects within it."" - This concept justifies a
State's proscribing the cause of harm as if it had actually occured within the
physical boundaries of thejurisdiction. This territorial principle has recently
evolved into the "effects" theory.
2. The "Effects" Theory.
The "effects" theory was first expressed in United States v. Hamburg-
Amerikanische P.F.A. Gessellschaft. 3" In regard to a contract initiated
abroad by foreign persons, the court ruled:
Citizens of foreign countries are not free to restrain or
monopolize the foreign commerce of this country by entering into
combinations abroad ..... .Such combinations are to be tested
by the same standards as similar combinations entered into here by
citizens of our country. The vital question in all cases is the same,
is the combination to so operate in this country as to directly and
materially affect our foreign commerce.34
28. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
29. See Certain Catalytic Converters, note 18 supra Certain Reclosable Plastic Bags, In-
vestigation No. 337-TA-22; Certain Color Television Receiving Sets, Investigation No. 337-
TA-23 (hereinafter Color Television Case),- Chicory Roots: Crude and Ground or Otherwise
Prepared, Investigation No. 337-TA-27 (hereinafter Chicory Roots). Stainless Steel Pipe and
Tube supra note 18. See also Swimming Pool Case, supra note 19 (Foreign manufacturer held to
have de facto intervened by including his name on response by American importers, and par-
ticipating in pre-investigative hearings).
30. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
31, See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law §§ 17, 20 (1965).
32. 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1916).
33. 200 F. 806 (S.D.N.Y. 1911); 216 F.2d 971 (S.D.N.Y. 1914), rev'd as moot, 239 U.S.
466 (1916).
34. Id. at 807 (emphasis added).
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The "effects" principle was broadened by Judge Hand in United States
v. Aluminum Company of America to include foreign acts (i.e., contracts,
licensing agreements, cartels, etc.) which apart from actually affecting
domestic commerce, might merely intend "to restrict imports to the United
States."3 "[l]f there is a contract abroad which on its face indicates an in-
tent3 6 and purpose to affect U. S. trade, the burden appears to be on the par-
ticipants to show that there has been no effect.""
In United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Centers,
Inc. i the "effects" theory was further expanded in order to assert in per-
sonam jurisdiction over Swiss watchmakers who had entered into a contract
intended to restrict U. S. trade, even though no American firm was directly
involved.39 The doctrine has become so broad that some courts have held
that the place where the contract is made, or where it is to be per-
formed, is inconsequential. The sole criterion is the agreement's "effect" on
U. S. commerce.
4
The "effects" doctrine is, in reality, a corollary to the interstate concept
of minimum contacts developed in International Shoe Co. v. Washington.
4
1
In order for the U.S.I.T.C. to be able to assert in personam jurisdiction over
a foreign entity, there must be sufficient minimum contacts with the forum
so as to warrant proper service of process.42 Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(i) provides for
service of process in a foreign country. Section 12 of the Clayton Act
43 out-
lines proper venue and service of process under the antitrust laws of the
United States:
Any suit, action or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a
corporation may be brought not only in the judicial district
35. 148 F.2d 416, 447 (2d Cir. 1945).
36. Absent a contract, or some other direct expression of intent, intent may be inferred
from the natural consequences of one's actions. See Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). See also Vanity Fair Mills, Inc. v. T. Eaton Co., 234 F.2d 633 (2d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied. 352 U.S 871 (1956). See Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations
Law §418 (1965).
37. W. Fugate, Foreign Commerce and the Antitrust Laws, 74 (2d ed. 1973).
38. 1963 Trade Cases 70,600 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
39. Accord, Frischer & Co. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247 (C.C.P.A. 1930) (Tariff Com-
mission case).
40. But see United States v. National Lead Co., 63 F. Supp. 513 (S.D.N.Y. 1945), modified
and affd., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
41. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
42. Miminum contact with the United States in general is sufficient to allow service of
process upon a foreign concern in a federal proceeding. See Holt v. Klosters, 355 F. Supp. 354
(W.D. Mich. 1973); Edward J. Moriarty & Co. v. General Tire & RubberCo., 289 F. Supp. 381
(S.D. Ohio 1967); First Flight Co. v. National Carloading Corp., 209 F. Supp. 730 (E.D. Tenn.
1963). See note 18 supra, for general discussion by U.S.I.T.C. Administrative Law Judge in
Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube.
43. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970).
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whereof it is an inhabitant, but also in any district wherein it may
be found or transacts business; and all process in such cases may
be served in the district of which it is an inhabitant, or wherever it
may be found.
In order to effect extraterritorial service of process the party must therefore
have transacted business or be located within the forum where the action is
to be brought.
Recently the concept of transacting business, or minimum contacts, has
been enlarged. In Honeywell, Inc. v. Metz Apparatewerke 4 a case where an
American patentee of electronic photographic flash equipment brought an
infringement action against a German manufacturer, the court held that un-
der the Illinois long-arm statute:
Direct contact with the forum state is not essential to the exer-
cise of personal jurisdiction. Metz may not have physically entered
the State of Illinois, but it placed its flash devices in the stream of
commerce under such circumstances that it should reasonably
have anticipated that injury through infringement would occur
there ....
We look to the economic and commercial realities of this case,
and in our view, it is not within the contemplation of the concepts
of fairness and due process to allow a wrong-doing manufacturer
to insulate himself from the long-arm of the courts by using an in-
termediary [i.e., importer, consignee or agent] or by professing
ignorance of the ultimate destination of his products.
45
By placing his goods into the stream of American commerce, the
foreign manufacturer is therefore vulnerable to U.S.I.T.C. in personam
jurisdiction. Should the Commission find his presence in a Section 337 in-
vestigation necessary, the foreign manufacturer may be named as a respon-
dent.
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction Under Section 337: The U.S.lT.C.'s Con-
current Powers With Other Administrative Agencies.
Concurrent jurisdiction between administrative agencies is not
necessarily a "congressional abberation":
44. 509 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1975).
45. Id. at 1144. Accord, Crucible Inc. v. Stora Kopparbergs Bergs, 403 F. Supp. 9 (W.D.
Pa. 1975); Knoll International, Inc. v. Continental, Inc., 278 PTCJ A-21 (5-13-76) (Eastern Dis-
trict of Pennsylvania case holding that mere knowledge of sale of company's product in United
States is sufficient to warrant long-arm jurisdiction over foreign manufacturer).
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[C]ongress may provide authority for more than one agency, ad-
ministrative or judicial, to act with respect to a particular matter.
It has done so both inadvertently and by design, on a number of
occasions.46
It is clear from the language of Section 337 that the statute is designed to
regulate anticompetitive conduct which also falls within the scope of the
Sherman Act,"7 the Clayton Act,4" and the Antidumping Act of 192 1.' Ac-
cordingly the U.S.I.T.C., the Federal Trade Commission, the Department
of Justice, and the Department of the Treasury, et a/., could potentially be
litigating the same case at any one moment, notwithstanding "gentleman's
agreements" between the agencies.50
Although it is generally understood that Section 337 of the Federal
Trade Act of 1974 has granted the U.S.I.T.C. jurisdiction to regulate "un-
fair trade practices in the importation of articles into the United States,"'"
most recently a dispute has arisen between the Commission and the Depart-
ment of the Treasury with regard to dumping complaints under the statute.
Subsection (b) (3) of Section 337 provides:
Whenever, in the course of an investigation under this section,
the Commission has reason to believe, based on information
before it, that the matter may come within the purview of section
303 or of the Antidumping Act, 1921, it shall promptly notify the
Secretary of the Treasury so that such action may be taken as is
otherwise authorized by such section and such Act.
52
Dumping is defined as "price discrimination between national
markets." 3 Its practice is proscribed by the Antidumping Act of 1921,11
which states in relevant part:
(a) Whenever the secretary of the Treasury.. . determines that a
class or kind of foreign merchandise is being, or is likely to be, sold
46. T.H. Sewell, Administrative Jurisdiction and Authority. 6 Ind. L. Rev. 446, 472 (1973).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1973 & Supp. 1977).
48. 15 U.SC. §§ 14, 18 (1973 & Supp- 1977).
49. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. 1975).
50. Agencies with concurrent jurisdictional powers often enter into "gentleman's agree-
ments" to avoid duplication of actions and resulting double liability to the parties involved.
For example, the FTC and the FDA have taken this course with regards to claims of false ad-
vertising and mislabeling. See Note, Res Judicata and Administrative Jurisdiction - A Proposal
for Resolving Conflicts Between Agencies with Over-Lapping Jurisdiction, 35 Geo. Wash. L, Rev.
1056, 1060 (1967). See FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948) (concurrent jurisdictions
between FTC and Justice over claims of unfair competition). See also, United States v. New
York Great A. & P. Tea Co., 67 F. Supp. 626 (E.D.Ill. 1940), affd 173 F.2d 79 (7th Cir. 1949).
51. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
52. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b) (3) (emphasis added) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
53. See J. Viner, Dumping: A Problem in International Trade, at 3 (1966).
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in the United States or elsewhere at less than its fair value, he shall
so advise the United States International Trade Commission, and
the Commission shall determine within three months thereafter
whether an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be
injured, or is prevented from being established by reason of the im-
portation of such merchandise into the United States. . ...
According to past practice, the Department of the Treasury, after making a
determination that a class of imports is being, or is likely to be, sold at less
than fair market value, refers the inquiry to the U.S.I.T.C. in order to deter-
mine whether an industry in the United States is being, or is likely to be, in-
jured.5 6 The question arises as to whether the U.S.I.T.C. may institute a
dumping investigation on its own initiative under Section 337, and whether
after making an injury determination it must refer the matter back to the
Treasury pursuant to Section 160 of the Antidumping Act of 1921, in order
to implement the appropriate relief.6 7
The U.S.I.T.C. has recently maintained that it can institute a dumping
investigation on its own initiative when the claim falls within the purview of
Section 337. Under such circumstances, the U.S.I.T.C. investigative staff
has taken the position that all it must do is "notify" the Department of the
Treasury of its actions, pursuant to Subsection (b) (3) of the statute."a
In recently completed investigations" the Commission's Ad-
ministrative Law Judge held that the U.S.I.T.C., pursuant to Section 337 of
the Trade Act of 1974, has jurisdiction to consider claims of predatory pric-
ing under the Robinson-Patman Act.60 Although prior to these investiga-
tions no case had yet arisen where Section 337 had been applied to
predatory pricing, the presiding officer, drawing from the substantial body
of law under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, reasoned that
54. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1965 & Supp. 1977).
55. Id. (emphasis added),
56. See Tariff Commn. Pocket Pencil Sharpeners from West Germany, PUB NO. 3, AA,
1971-73 (1955). (Tariff Commission found no injury and referred proceeding back to Depart-
ment of the Treasury).
57. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) of the Antidumping Act of 1921 also states: "The Commission, af-
ter such investigation as it deems necessary, shall notify the Secretary [of the Treasury] of its
determination, and if that determination is in the affirmative, the Secretary shall make public a
notice (hereinafter in this Act called a 'finding') of his determination and the determination of
the Commission."
58. See discussion of Swimming Pool Case. supra note 19 see also Color Television Case,
supra note 29. The Commission Memorandum Opinion stated that, "it is our opinion that sec-
tion 337 embraces dumping and all other unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the
importation of articles or in their sale."
59. Color Television Case, supra note 29. Swimming Pool Case, supra note 19. Stainless
Steel Pipe and Tube, supra note 18.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1973).
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the statute is sufficiently broad so as to proscribe this form of unfair com-
petition .61
It is well established that the tests for predatory pricing are: (1) a com-
petitor is charging a price below his average variable cost in the competitive
market; or (2) the competitor is charging a price below its short-run profit
maximizing price, and barriers to entry are great enough to enable the dis-
criminator to reap the benefits of his predation before new entry is
possible. 62 Predation may occur when a seller prices his commodities well
above cost in one geographic area in order to generate sufficient profit to
price his articles below cost in another geographic market, thereby injuring
competition in the latter market.63
An injury determination under the Antidumping Act of 1921 may be
found when the seller is pricing his goods at less than fair value.6 ' Fair value
represents the equivalent of "foreign market value."' 5 If a foreign seller is
pricing his merchandise at below the foreign market value (of his own or
third countries) in the United States, he is therefore dumping. Should the
U.S.I.T.C. find that a foreign manufacturer's dumping creates "more than a
de minimus injury" to United States competition, the Department of the
Treasury shall customarily impose special dumping duties under the
Antidumping Act of 1921.66
61. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536 (1960), FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37 (1948); Corn Products Refining Co. v. FTC, 324 U.S. 726 (1945); Borden Co. v. FTC,
381 F.2d 175 (5th Cir. 1967) (FTC action for predatory pricing under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a));
Samuel H. Moss, Inc. v. FTC, 148 F.2d 378 (2d Cir. 1945) (claims of predatory pricing pur-
suant to 15 U.S.C. § 45) (1973 & Supp. 1977).
62. International Air Industries v. American Excelsior Co., 517 F.2d 714 (5th Cir. 1975).
Citing Areeda & Turner, Predatory Practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 Harv. L.
Rev. 697, 716 (1975) the court stated that average variable cost is substituted for marginal cost
in predatory pricing determinations because: "It is frequently quite difficult to calculate the in-
cremental cost of making and selling the last unit (i.e., marginal cost) from a conventional
business account. . . . Consequently, the firm's average varible cost (average variable cost is
the cost that varies with changes in output divided by the output) may be effectively substituted
for marginal cost in predatory pricing analysis.. . .Thus a firm's pricing behavior can be con-
sidered anti-competitive when it sells at a price below its average variable cost," Id. at 724. See
Scherer, Predatory Pricing and the Sherman Act: A Comment, 89 Harv.L.Rev. 869 (1976).
63. See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685 (1967).
64. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (Supp. V 1975).
65. 19 U.S.C. § 164 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
66. 19 U.S.C. § 161 (1970 & Supp. 1977). This section provides in relevant part: "if the
purchase price or the exporter's sales price is less than the foreign market value (or, in the ab-
sence of such value, than the constructed value), there shall be levied, collected, and paid, in ad-
dition to any other duties imposed thereon by law, a special dumping duty in an amount equal
to such difference."
See Northern Bleached Hardwood Kraft Pulp From Canada, 38 Fed. Reg. 87 (Tariff
Commission 1973); Instant Potato Granules From Canada, 37 Fed. Reg. 18505 (Tariff Com-
mission 1972), (pre-Fedcral Trade Act of 1974 cases dealing with injury determination by Tariff
Commission).
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Because a claim of predatory pricing under Section 3377 involves a
finding that the seller has been pricing below cost, the U.S.I.T.C. has re-
cently asserted that a dumping determination of lower than fair value is
necessarily included in (or subsumed by) any investigation of predation. On
these grounds the Commission has argued that it may initiate a dumping in-
quiry pursuant to Section 337 and need only "notify" the Department of the
Treasury under Subsection (b) (3) of U.S.I.T.C. action.66 Predictably,
Customs has balked at this interpretation, claiming that only the Depart-
ment of the Treasury has jurisdiction to initiate dumping claims pursuant to
the Antidumping Act.
The Department of the Treasury has countered the assertion of
U.S.I.T.C. jurisdiction of dumping claims falling within the purview of Sec-
tion 337 (predatory pricing) by citing the legislative history of Section 337
before the Senate Finance Committee.69 The Commission also cites
legislative history in support of its view that Section 337 is an "antidumping
statute."70 There is little indication at this time as to whether the U.S.I.T.C.
or the Department of the Treasury will accede to the other's jurisdictional
claims pursuant to predatory pricing and dumping under Section 337 and
the Antidumping Act of 1921. The matter may be headed for a confronta-
tion in the federal courts.
This conflict is exemplary of the growing pains of the U.S.I.T.C. under
its new powers granted by Section 337 of the Federal Trade Act of 1974. The
67. See Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1973).
68. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(3). See Color Television Case, supra note 29 Swimming Pool Case,
supra note 19.
69. Senate Report on H.R. 10710, supra note 24, at 195 states: "Section 337(b)(3), as
amended by this bill, would provide that the Commission, when it has reason to believe based
on information available to it that the subject matter of an investigation it is conducting may
come within the purview of Section 303 of the Tariff Act of 1930 or of the Antidumping Act,
1921, shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury so that such action may be taken as is otherwise
authorized by Section 303 or the Antidumping Act. It is expected that the Commission's practice
of not investigating matters clearly within the purview of either Section 303 or the Antidumping
Act will continue" (emphasis added).
70. Regarding Section 316 of the Tariff Act of 1922, a forerunner to Section 337 of the
Federal Trade Act of 1974, The Report of the Senate Committee on Finance (S. Rep. No. 595,
Pt. 1, 67th Cong., 2d Sess. (1974)) asserts: "[T]he provision relating to unfair methods of com-
petition in the importation of goods is broad enough to prevent every type and form of unfair
practice and is, therefore, a more adequate protection to American industry than any antidump-
ing statute the country has ever had." (emphasis added).
In a Senate debate Senator Smoot elucidated on this point: " We have in this measure an an-
tidumping law with teeth in it - one which will reach all forms of unfair competition in importa-
tion. This Section 316 not only prohibits dumping in the ordinary accepted meaning of the
word; that is, the sale of merchandise in the United States for less than its foreign market value
or cost of production; but also bribery, espionage, misrepresentation of goods, full-line forcing
and other similar practices frequently more injurious to trade than price cutting." (emphasis
added.) 62 Cong. Rec. 5879 (1922). See Color Television Case, supra note 29.
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Act has provided the once fledgling agency (Tariff Commission) with
greater powers. The U.S.I.T.C. must now confront the concurrent jurisdic-
tional power of the established governmental agencies. It can no longer hide
behind the executive power of the President, as it once did pursuant to Sec-
tion 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930. 71 This is no small task considering that
such governmental entities as the Department of the Treasury, the FTC and
the Department of Justice have been asserting jurisdiction over unfair trade
practices for decades.
Needless to say, respondents in U.S.I.T.C. Section 337 actions are dis-
turbed at the prospect of being sued in more than one administrative agency
on the same set of facts. Such a result is not, however, unique in the
American system of administrative law. 2
The fact that a U.S.I.T.C. Section 337 respondent may be involved in
similar proceedings before two or more administrative agencies does not
mean that the doctrine of res judicata can be invoked should one agency
reach a final determination before the other:
The moral of the story. . seems to be that a determination under
one statute is not binding when the same question arises under
another statute, even when the provisions of the two statutes are iden-
tical. Because the legislative history of two statutes is always dif-
ferent, because the purposes of the two statutes are never the same,
and because the context of provisions must be taken into account,
the conclusion is probably sound that a determination under one
statute need not necessarily be resjudicata when the same question
arises under the identical words of another statute.7
3
Should the Department of the Treasury reach a final determination in a
case involving dumping pursuant to the Antidumping Act of 192 17 before
the U.S.I.T.C. completes a similar investigation of predatory pricing and
71. See note 2 supra.
72. See New York Cent. Ry. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n. 237 Ind. 544, 147 N.E. 2d 547
(1958) (dual regulation of street crossings by Town Board and the Public Service Commission
held permissible); Fresh Grown Preserve Corp. v. FTC, 125 F.2d 917 (2d Cir. 1942) (FTC's ex-
ercise of jurisdiction over a false advertising claim held not be preclude the FDA from in-
vestigating and proscribing remedy to false labeling claim regarding same misrepresentation);
Mendez v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, Inc., 345 F. Supp. 527 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (agencies concurrent
jurisdiction to impose remedies under differing statutes regarding trademark infringement, pur-
suant to the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1526 and the Lanham Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§
32(I) (a), 43 (a), 1114(l) (a), 1124, 1125 held permissible).
73. 2 Davis, Administrative Law, § 18.04 at 577-87 (emphasis added) (1958). See generally
United States v. Chicago N.S. & M. Ry. Co., 288 U.S. 1 (1933), 219 ICC 135 (1936), 234 ICC
13 (1939); Sprague v. Woll, 122 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1941); Gen. Tel. Co. v. Robinson, 132 F.
Supp. 39 (E.D. Ark. 1955); Vajta v. Watkins, 88 F. Supp. 51 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Otis & Co. v.
Pennsylvania Ry. Co., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
74. 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1965 & Supp. 1977).
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dumping under Section 337 of the Federal Trade Act of 1974, the prior
Treasury ruling would therefore not act as a bar to a subsequent Commis-
sion decision. Appropriate relief could be sanctioned by either or both
governmental entities."
Ili. THE REGULATORY SCOPE OF SECTION 337.
As is true with Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the
scope of Section 337 encompasses nearly the entire body of antitrust law. In
the Commission Memorandum Opinion in Chicory Roots 76 it was held:
Although there are [as yet] no judicial precedents involving non-
patent cases arising under Section 337, judicial determinations un-
der other antitrust and unfair competition statutes are persuasive in
determining what constitutes an unfair method or act under Sec-
tion 337. The Commission has in previous investigations both un-
der the prior Section 337 and under Section 337 as it exists today,
used the antitrust laws and the practice thereunder as the standard
for unfair methods of competition and unfair acts.77
75. See Kleinfeld & Goding, Res Judicata and Two Coordinate Federal Agencies, 95 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 388 (1947).
76. See note 29 supra,
77. Id. (emphasis added) Accord, In Re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (Tariff
Commission).
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The scope of Section 337 may also extend beyond the anticompetitive con-
duct proscribed by the antitrust statutes.7"
Within the language of Section 337(a) is found an abbreviated reference
to the Sherman Antitrust Act."5 Section 337(a) states that an owner, im-
porter, consignee or agent of either may not "restrain or monopolize trade
78. In Frischer & Co., Inc. v. Bakelite Corp., 39 F.2d 247, 259 (C.C.P.A. 1930), cert.
denied. 282 U.S. 852 (1930) the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals outlined the scope of Sec-
tion 337: "'What constitutes unfair methods of competition or unfair acts is ultimately a ques-
tion of law for the court and not for the Commission. . . . Each case of unfair competition
must be determined upon its own facts, owing to the multifarious means by which it is sought
to effectuate such schemes."
The court in In re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447, 454-55 (C.C.P.A. 1934) similarly
held: "We are of the opinion that when Congress used the phrase, in Section 337(a) of the Tariff
Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a), 'unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importa-
tion of articles into the United States,' it did not intend that before such methods or acts could
be stopped, the act had to fall within the technical definition of unfair methods of competition
as it had been defined in some of the decisions, but we think that if unfair methods of competi-
tion or unfair acts in the importation of articles into the United States are being practiced or
performed by any one, they are to be regarded as unlawful, and the section was intended to pre-
vent them."
The court further stated in In re Amtorg Trading Corp., 75 F.2d 826, 831 (C.C.P.A. 1935):
"The words 'unfair methods of competition' may include acts which have never been
specifically declared by the courts to be unfair."
In Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 533 (1935) the Supreme Court,
comparing the scope of Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to Section 337 of the
Tariff Act of 1930, stated that unfair methods of competition are "to be determined in par-
ticular instances, upon evidence, in the light of particular competitive conditions of which is
found to be a specific and substantial public interest." Accord. FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson
Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972); FTC v. Texaco, Inc., 393 U.S. 233 (1968); FTC v. Motion Picture Ad-
vertising Serv. Co., 344 U.S. 392 (1953).
The terms "unfair methods of competition" or "unfair acts" of Section 337 have a broader
based meaning than the words "unfair competition" at common law. In re Orion Co., 71 F.2d
458 (C.C.P.A. 1934) states: "In discussing the meaning of the phrase 'unfair methods of com-
petition,' the Supreme court, speaking through Sutherland, Justice, called attention to the fact
that the words 'unfair competition' had a well-settled meaning at common law, and that to ob-
viate a narrow construction, the words 'unfair methods of competition' were substituted by the
Congress. As to this term, the Court said, "It belongs to that class of phrases which do not ad-
mit of precise definition, but the meaning and application of which must be arrived at by what
this court elsewhere has called 'the gradual process of judicial inclusion and exclusion.' "
For Commission decisions concerning the scope of Section 337, see, Certain Electronic
Audio and Related Equipment, Investigation No. 337-TA-7, U.S.I.T.C. Publication 768 (April
1976) (opinions of Commissioners Moore, Bedell, and Parker and the concurring opinion of
Chairman Leonard). See also, Tariff Comm., Tractor Parts: Report to the President on In-
vestigation No. 337-22, Pub. No. 443 (1971) (statement of Commissioner Leonard).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 1, 2 (1974 & Supp. 1977).
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and commerce in the United States .... *"0 Although sections 1 and 2 of
the Sherman Act have not been as frequently applied in the international
arena as they have to unfair trade practices occurring within the physical
boundaries of the United States, relevant case law does establish the law's
potency in regulating competition within the stream of American (foreign)
commerce.
tt
Sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act of 191412 also fall within the pur-
80. The reference to restraint of trade directs one to § I of the Sherman Act, while the
Act's inclusion of the word "monopolize" activates § 2 of the Sherman Act.
The Sherman Act §§ 1, 2 provides:
"Sec. I. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, is declared to
be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination
or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished
by fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred
thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding 3 years, or by both said punishments in the
discretion of courts." (emphasis added.)
"Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or con-
spire with any other person or persons to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony and, on conviction
thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any
other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding 3 years, or by
both said punishments in the discretion of courts." (emphasis added.)
81. See United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174 (1963) (§ 2 conspiracy to
monopolize American sewing machine market by American, Swiss and Italian manufacturers);
United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949) (§ I restraint of
trade - world market division affecting U.S. commerce constitutes per se violation of Sherman
Act); United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 34 F. Supp. 267 (S.D.N.Y. 1940) (§ I
restraint of trade - world market division affecting U.S. commerce constitutes per se violation
of Sherman Act); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274 U.S. 268 (1927) (§ 2 monopolization of
American sisal market by Mexican and American manufacturers).
Recent U.S.I.T.C. cases under Section 337 have alleged Sherman § I and § 2 violations. See
Color Television Case, note 29 supra (§ I allegationis: restraint of trade, conspiracy in restraint of
trade; § 2 allegations: monopolization, attempt to monopolize, complaint filed against Japanese
color television manufacturers and their United States importers); Chicory Roots, note 29supra
(@ I allegations: refusal to deal [per se, boycotting [per se], conspiracy to monopolize. § 2
allegations - attempted monopolization).
Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 also encompassed Sherman § I and
§ 2 violations. See Certain Watches, Watch Movements and Watch Parts from Switzerland, In-
vestigation No. 337-19, Tariff Comm'n. Pub. 171 (June 1966) (§ I allegations: restraint of trade;
§ 2 allegations: monopolization of United States watch industry. Tariff Commission terminated
investigation when foreign party and American importers held to have conspired to
monopolize trade in Justice Department suit); Certain Tractor Parts, Investigation No. 337-22,
Tariff Comm'n. Pub. 401 (June 1971) (§ I allegations of conspiracy to monopolize American
tractor parts industry between Italian manufacturer and United States distributor; settled
before final determination).
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1973).
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view of Section 337 of the Federal Trade Act of 1974.3 Although the
U.S.I.T.C. has yet to receive a Section 337 complaint pursuant to either of
these antitrust statutes, it is clear that Section 3 exclusive dealing or tying
arrangements between a foreign manufacturer, or exporter, and an
American importer, would violate the Federal Trade Act."4 Similarly, under
Section 7, acquisitions by one corporation of the stock or assets of another
could be prohibited where the effect of such acquisitions may be substan-
tially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly."
83. Section 3 of the Clayton Act of 1914 provides: "It shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise,
machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented . . . for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or any in-
sular possession or other possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States,
or fix a price charged therefor, or discount from, or rebate upon, such price, on the condition,
agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the
goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities of a competitor or com-
petitors of the lessor or seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such
condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to
create a monopoly in any line of commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1973).
Section 7 of the Clayton Act of 1914 states: "No corporation engaged in commerce shall
acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share of capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the
whole or any part of the assets of another corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be substan-
tially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a monopoly.
No corporation shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or
other share capital and no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of one or more corporations engaged in
commerce, where in any line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such ac-
quisition, of such stocks or assets, or the use of such stock by the voting or granting of proxies
or otherwise, may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly." 15
U.S.C. § 18 (1973).
84. See generally Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953) (ty-
ing); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947) (tying); Kirihara v. Bendix,
306 F. Supp. 72 (D.C. Hawaii 1969) (exclusive dealing) Judson L. Thomson Mfg. Co. v. FTC,
150 F.2d 952 (lst Cir. 1945) (exclusive dealing) (non-Section 337 cases).
85. See United States v. Schlitz Brewing Co., 253 F. Supp. 129 (N.D.Cal. 1966) affd., 385
U.S. 37 (1966), rehearing denied, 385 U.S. 1021 (1967) (horizontal acquisition by American
beer company of Canadian beer company held § 7 violation as having the tendency to eliminate
competition in the domestic market); In re Litton Industries, Inc., FTC Dkt. 8778 (FTC April
10, 1969) (horizontal acquisition by American typewriter company of German typewriter com-
pany held § 7 violation as it foreclosed potential competition by German company in U.S.
market); United States v. Standard Oil Co., 1970 Trade Cases. 72,988 (N.D. Ohio 1969) (con-
sent decree; proposed horizontal merger between Standard Oil of Ohio and British Petroleum
Company held to have tendency to substantially lessen competition in domestic oil market);
United States v. Aluminum Ltd., 268 F. Supp. 758 (D.N.J. 1966) (consent decree; vertical ac-
quisition by large Canadian aluminum producer of American fabricating plant seen as
violating § 7); United States v. Asiatic Petroleum Corp., 1971 Trade Cases. 73,689 (D. Mass.
1971) (consent decree; vertical acquisition by Dutch fuel oil supplier of American fuel dis-
tributor seen as violating § 7).
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Although the U.S.I.T.C. under Section 337 of the Federal Trade Act of
1974 can neither enjoin nor order dissolution of acquisitions (mergers), it is
conceivable that where a vertical merger between a foreign manufacturer
and an American importer has the tendency to lessen competition in
American commerce the Commission could, under Subsections (e) and (d),
issue a temporary or permanent exclusion order barring foreign imports
from the American market. The same reasoning might apply to horizontal
mergers between American and foreign firms.
It is arguable that a Section 337(0 cease and desist order could be used
to prevent a merger that might have the tendency or effect of lessening com-
petition in the importation of articles into the United States.
86
Whether Section 337 may be employed now to regulate mergers is
speculative. Pending the outcome of the U.S.I.T.C.'s "concurrent jurisdic-
tional squabble" with the Department of the Treasury over antidumping
policy, the Commission will have to decide whether it wishes to challenge
the Department of Justice and the FTC's traditional role in policing mergers
affecting the stream of American commerce.
As previously stated, the provisions of the Robinson-Patman Act,8"
outlawing price discrimination in American commerce, also fall within the
purview of Section 337 of the Federal Trade Act of 1974.11
Claims of predatory pricing under Section 13a of the Robinson-Patman
Act have been the subject of several recent U.S.I.T.C. Section 337 investiga-
tions."
86. See generally Rosenthal, Imports and Section 7 of the Clayton A ct, 60 Cornell L. J. 600-
636 (1975).
87. I5 U.S.C. § 12-27 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
88. See Baysoy v. Jessup Steel Co., 90 F. Supp. 303 (W.D. Pa. 1950) (Robinson-Patman
Act applies to imports). See also Rowe, Discriminatory Sales of Commodities in Commerce:
Jurisdictional Criteria Under the Robinson-Patman Act, 67 Yale L.J. 1155, 1170 (1958).
89. See Color Television Case. note 29 supra; Swimming Pool Case, note 19 supra; Chicory
Roots, note 29 supra; Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, note 18 supra.
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Section 72 of the Unfair Competition Act of 191690 also provides a
basis for a Section 337 predatory pricing investigation. This obscure enact-
ment of the early tariff laws of the United States has somehow survived
legislative remodeling to offer a Section 337 complainant a cause of action
for predation otherwise unavailable in certain factual settings pursuant to
the Robinson-Patman Act.9 Whereas predation requires a showing of sales
below cost, or unreasonably low priced sales under the Robinson-Patman
Act, 92 Section 72 merely requires that the imported articles be sold at a
"price substantially less than the actual market value or wholesale price"93
in order to constitute predatory pricing.9" However, unlike Section 13a of
the Robinson-Patman Act, Section 72 stipulates that a complainant must
prove predatory intent.
Because of the inherent difficulty in showing intent to predatorily price,
as well as the general misunderstanding among the international antitrust
bar that Section 72 of the Unfair Competition Act was repealed by the
Tariff Act of 1930,11 this provision has seldom been used in Section 337
90. 15 U.S.C. § 72 states: Importation or sale of articles at less than market value or
wholesale price. It shall be unlawful for any person importing or assisting in importing any arti-
cles from any foreign country into the United States, commonly and systematically to import,
sell or cause to be imported or sold such articles within the United States at a price substantially
less than the actual market value or wholesale price of such articles, at the time of exportation to
the United States, in the principal markets of the country of their production, or of other
foreign countries to which they are commonly exported after adding to such market value or
wholesale price, freight, duty, and other charges and expenses necessarily incident to the impor-
tation and sale thereof in the United States: Provided, that such act or acts be done with the
intent of destroying or injuring an industry in the United States, or of preventing the establish-
ment of an industry in the United States, or of restraining or monopolizing any part of trade
and commerce in such articles in the United States.
Any person who violates or combines or conspires with any other person to violate this
section is guilty of a misdemeanor, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not
czceeding $5,000, or imprisonment not exceeding one year, or both, in the discretion of the
court.
Any person injured in his business or property by reason of any violation of, or combina-
tion or conspiracy to violate, this section, may sue therefor int he district court of the United
States for the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect
to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages sustained, and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
The foregoing provisions shall not be construed to deprive the proper State courts of
jurisdiction in actions for damages thereunder (emphasis added).
91. 15 U.S.C, § 13a (1973).
92. 15 U.S.C, § 13a (1973). See Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685
(1967).
93 15 U.S.C. § 72 (1973).
94. This standard is similar to the one employed in antidumping violations. Antidumping
Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160 (1965 & Supp. 1977).
95, 19 U,S,C, § 2101 (1977).
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proceedings. Given the "right" set of factual circumstances, however, Sec-
tion 72 of the Unfair Competition Act could be quite helpful in proving
predatory pricing.
Dumping violations may also come within the purview of Section 337
of the Federal Trade Act of 1974.96
From the U.S.I.T.C.'s era as the United States Tariff Commission to
the present, claims of patent infringement have always been the most fre-
quent unfair trade practice investigated under Section 337. As was true un-
der the Tariff Act of 1930, the Federal Trade Act of 1974 allows the Com-
mission to reach determinations concerning patent infringement, not patent
invalidity.97
The Commission does not therefore possess authority to declare a pa-
tent invalid, deeming it unenforceable. In In Re Von Clemm, 9 the court
held:
We have repeatedly held that in cases of this character, involving
alleged unfair acts in connection with a patented article or process,
the validity of the patent or patents involved may not be
questioned by the Tariff Commission [U.S.I.T.C.] nor by this
court on appeal therefrom, but that a regularly issued patent must
be considered valid unless a court of competent jurisdiction has
held otherwise.99
Because it lacked authority to declare a patent invalid, the Tariff Commis-
sion would often stay an investigation in order to await a ruling on patent
validity by a court of competent jurisdiction. 0 With the U.S.I.T.C.'s new
time limit of one year for Section 337 investigations (or eighteen months in
96. See generally Tariff Comm., Ann. Rep. (1971-74) (pre-U.S.I.T.C. antidumping policy)
(1965 & Supp. 1977).
97. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a). See Frischer & Co. v. Elting, 60 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 287 U.S. 649 (1932) (Tariff Commission); Synthetic Star Sapphires and Synthetic
Rubies, Investigation No. 337-13 (1954) (Tariff Commission); In re Furazolidone, Investigation
No. 737-21. Tariff Comm'n. Pub. 299 (Nov. 1969) (Tariff Commission).
In re Northern Pigment Co., 71 F.2d 447 (C.C.P.A. 1932) exemplifies the underlying policy
of Section 337: that acts not constituting infringement under applicable United States law may
still be considered an unfair act by the Commission. In this case, the importation of an un-
patented product produced under a valid United States process patent, was held illegal pur-
suant to § 1337(a). The court held "The importation for use, sale, or exchange of a product
made, produced, processed, or mined under or by means of a process covered by the claims of
any unexpired valid United States letters patent, shall have the same status for the purposes of
section 1337 of this title as the importation of any product or article covered by the claims of
any unexpired valid United States letters patent."
98. 229 F. 2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (Tariff Commission).
99. Id. at 444.
100. See Tariff Comm., Electron Tubes and Component Parts Thereof, Ann. Rep. 27
(1957).
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more complicated cases),'5 ' it is less likely that the Commission would sus-
pend a proceeding to await a judicial determination of patent validity.
Although patent validity may not be considered by the U.S.I.T.C. un-
der Section 337 of the Federal Trade Act of 1974, all legal and equitable
defenses going to this claim may, however, be raised by the respondent. 02
Such defenses may include patent invalidity, patent misuse and fraud on the
Patent Office.03
Commission patent infringement determinations are not binding for
purposes other than Section 337 proceedings. 04 U.S.I.T.C. decisions
regarding claims of infringement under the patent laws of the United States
therefore do not enjoy res judicata or collateral estoppel effect when ap-
pealed to the U. S. Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.105
Although the Commission's history under Section 337 consists
primarily of investigations conducted pursuant to the antitrust and patent
statutes of the United States, "[tlhe courts have endorsed the principle that
the statute is 'broad and inclusive' and that 'Congress intended to allow
wide discretion in determining what practices are to be regarded as un-
fair. ' 0 6 As stated in Korber Hats, Inc. v. FTC,01 "what is an unfair
'method' of competition can only be assayed in the environmental and
marketing context of the particular practice put in issue." In Schecter
Poultry Corp. v. United States,""0 the Court stated: "What are unfair
methods of competition are thus to be determined in particular instances
upon evidence in light of the particular competitive conditions and what is
found to be a specific and substantial public interest."
Recently in Solder Removing Wicks, 10 the Commission instituted a
Section 337 investigation involving claims of patent infringement, passing-
off, false advertising, and false labeling. The cause was unique in that claims
of false labeling and advertising characteristically fall within the jurisdiction
of the FTC and the FDA, when food and drugs are involved. No conflict,
101. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1965 & Supp 1977).
102. See Lear Inc v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).
103. See Ram, Patent Fraud: A New Defense?, 54 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y. 363, 371 (1972).
104. In re Von Clemm, 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (Tarriff Commission).
105. Trade Reform Act of 1974, Report of the Senate Committee on Finance, Together
With Additional Views on H.R. 10710, S.Doc. No. 93-1298, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. 196-197
(1974). But see Kaye and Plaia, Revitalization of Unfair Trade Causes in the Importation of
Goods: An Analysis of the Amendments to Section 337, 57 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y. 208, 284-85 (1975).
106. T. Silberger, Trade Act of1974: New Remedies Against Unfair Trade Practices in In-
ternational Trade. 5 Den. J. Int'l. L. & Pol'y. 77, 97 (1975) (hereinafter Silberger). See In re Von
Clemm, 229 F.2d 441 (C.C.P.A. 1955) (Tarriff Commission).
107. 358 F.2d, 361 (lst Cir. 1962).
108. 295 U.S. 495, 533 (1935).
109. Investigation No. 337-TA-26 (hereinafter Solder Removing Wicks Case).
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however, is envisioned with these agencies over concurrent jurisdiction., 0
The Solder Removing Wicks CaseIII is also important because it exemplifies,
perhaps more than any other investigation to date, the expanding regulatory
scope of the U.S.I.T.C. under Section 337.
A. Passing Off Claim.
Imitation of a non-functional characteristic of a competitor's product,
for the sole purpose of passing one's goods off for those of another, con-
stitutes an unfair trade practice. II2 In Luminous Unit Co. v. R. Williamson &
Co., ' 3 it was established that passing off consisted of "[m]isrepresenting the
origin of the goods, or their source of manufacture or distribution .
The court added that:
[Mlispresentation as to the origin of the goods may, of course,
be either express or implied. If a manufacturer makes the labels or
boxes so similar in appearance, or unnecessarily colors or orna-
ments his article so much like the other article that purchasers are
likely to be deceived as to the origin or source, this fact may be an
element of evidence that he has adopted those colors or labels or
outward appearances for the purpose of assisting him in mis-
representing the origin of the goods and in palming off his goods
as those of the other manufacturer.'
1 4
A claim of passing off will usually lie where the imitation of the
physical details and designs of a competitor's product are nonfunctional and
have acquired a secondary meaning, "but where [the) features are functional
110. From the U.S.I.T.C.'s inception under the Federal Trade Act of 1974, the FTC has
understood that Section 337 has granted the Commission similar powers to those authorized by
15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970 & Supp. 1975) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, but limited them to
regulating articles introduced into the American stream of commerce through importation.
Whether the Food and Drug Administration will accede to similar concurrent jurisdiction
(over food and drugs), without objecting, at this point in time, is conjecture. Because the FDA
has reached a "gentleman's agreement" with the FTC over claims of mislabeling and false ad-
vertising, the likelihood is that it will also reach an accord with the U.S.I.T.C.
What makes jurisdictional over-lap between the U.S.I.T.C, and the FDA all the more
duplicative is that the remedy proscribed by the Federal Food, Drug and Administration Act,
21 U.S.C. § 331(a) is similar to a temporary or permanent exclusion order under Section 337(e)
and (d) of the Federal Trade Act of 1974. Section 331(a) prohibits "[tihe introduction or
delivery for introduction into interstate commerce of any food, drug, device, or cosmetic that is
adulterated or misbranded."
11. See note 109 supra.
112. See Wawack Co. v. Kaiser, 90 F.2d 694 (7th cir, 1937); Lektro-Shave v. General
Shaver Corp., 92 F.2d 435 (2d Cir. 1937).
113. 241 F. Supp. 265, at 268, 269 (N.D. Ill. 1917).
114. Id. Accord, Elastic Stop Nut Corp. of America v. Greer, 62 F. Supp. 363 (N.D. Ill
1945); Thiefield v. Postman's Fifth Avenue Corp., 37 F. Supp. 958 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); Joyce, Inc.
v. Fern Shoe Co., 32 F. Supp. 401 (S.D. Cal. 1940).
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there is normally no right to relief."' II Some cases have held that, while im-
itation of a functional design of a competitor's product will not ordinarily
constitute an unfair trade practice, should this functional characteristic also
have a secondary meaning, the manufacturer must take reasonable steps to
avoid confusion. ' 6 The standard of taking reasonable steps to avoid
confusion might be met where the foreign producer or importer identifies
the article by inscribing its name in bold lettering on the goods.",
Should it be determined that an importer or foreign manufacturer is
passing off goods as those of another, the Commission may, pursuant to
Section 337(d), (e), or (f), issue a temporary or permanent exclusion order,
or a cease and desist order to halt this unfair trade practice."'
B. False Advertising and False Labeling Claim.
False advertising as an unfair competitive practice occurs where a
promotional act creates a "likelihood of deception.""I9 Deception in adver-
tising may be by innuendo, as well as by explicit false statement.' 20 The
Commission may look not only to the meaning of the words used, but also
to all that is reasonably implied.' 21 In considering whether an advertisement
constitutes an unfair act, the entirety of the advertisement must therefore be
considered. 2 2 Representations capable of being construed in both a false
and a truthful fashion will be interpreted against the advertiser.' 23
False labeling as an unfair trade practice is generally treated in the same
manner as false advertising. Several cases hold, however, that labeling
115. Pagliero v. Wallace China Co., Ltd., 198 F.2d 339 (9th Cir. 1952). Accord, Schwinn
Bicycle Co. v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co., 339 F. Supp. 973 (M.D. Tenn. 1971).
116. See Vaughan Novelty Mfg. Co. v. G. G. Greene Mfg. Corp., 202 F.2d 172 (3d cir.
1953). Accord, Interlego A.G.v. The Leslie-Henry Co., Inc., 214 F. Supp. 238 (M.D. Pa. 1963).
117. Vaughan, supra note 116.
118. In the early Tariff Commission case of Cigar Lighters, Investigation No. 6, the
agency issued an exclusion order on grounds that the foreign lighter had infringed upon the pa-
tent of the American lighter. Several years after the patent had expired on the United States
lighter, an importer again tried to bring the foreign cigar lighter into the American market. The
Collector of Customs again refused entry. S. J. Charia & Co., as the importer of record, ap-
pealed to the Customs Court. The court found continued "simulation" of the American
product and upheld the ruling of the Collector of Customs. S. J. Charia A Co. v. United States,
103 U.S.P.Q. 252 (Cust. Ct. 1954).
119. See Montgomery Ward & Co. v. FTC, 379 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1967); National Bakers
Services, Inc. v. FTC, 329 F.2d 365 (7th Cir. 1964).
120. Id. See Aronberg v. FTC, 132 F.2d 165 (7th Cir. 1942).
121. See Niresk Industries, Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir. 1960); Gold Seal Co. v.
Weeks, 129 F. Supp. 928 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
122. See Continental Way Corp. v. FTC, 330 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1964); Murray Space Shoe
Corp. v. FTC, 304 F.2d 270 (2d Cir. 1962).
123. See Country Tweeds, Inc. v. FTC, 326 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Barrels of Vinegar, 265 U.S. 438 (1924).
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should meet a higher standard of veracity than advertising.' 24 In Korber
Hats, Inc. v. FTC,' 5 the Court reasoned:
While advertising and labeling are frequently considered
together, there is good reason to insist upon a higher degree of
veracity in the latter. It may be argued that consumers accept
labeling statements literally while perhaps viewing with a more
jaundiced eye the vaunted claims of the advertising media. . . . In
the final analysis the validity of a label should be judged by the
predictable inference a prospective customer will draw from it. 
2
6
Claims of false labeling and advertising may arise in several situations.
In the Solder Removing Wicks Case'27 complainants alleged that where
respondents had labeled their solder wicks with the trademark registration
symbol®, and circulated an advertising brochure containing the phrase "pat-
ent applied for," these misrepresentations of false labeling and advertising
constituted an unfair method of competition pursuant to Section 337.
Because the right to use a trademark is not acquired through registra-
tion, '2 but through continual use,' 2 9 it is unlikely that a misrepresentation
of trademark registration would lead to an injury determination under Sec-
tion 337. Similarly, it may be difficult to find the requisite Section 337 "in-
jury to an industry" from a false claim of "patent applied for," in an adver-
124. See Berkey & Gray Furniture Co. v. FTC, 42 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1930).
125. 358 F.2d 358 (1st Cir. 1962).
126. Id. at 361.
127. See note 109, supra.
128. See Emerson Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Emerson Radio & Phonograph Corp., 105 F. 2d 908
(2d Cir. 1939): Dixie-Cola Laboratories, Inc. v. Coca-Cola Co., 117 F.2d 352 (4th Cir. 1941).
129. See Great W. Financial Corp. v. Savings & Loan Ass'n. of Okla, 406 F. Supp. 1287
(W.D. Okla. 1975); Curtis-Stephens-Embry Co., v. Pro-Tek-Toe Skate Stop Co., 199 F.2d 407
(8th Cir. 1952).
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tising brochure.3 0 However, unfair trade practices have been found, where
false claims of trademark registration are made in addition to other false
representations, as having "the tendency and capacity to increase the effect
of false representations."''
Although claims of false labeling and false advertising in the Solder
Removing Wicks Case' were never actually considered by the Commission,
the very filing of these allegations before the U.S.I.T.C. is important
because it represents an increased awareness by the international bar of the
130. A misrepresentation of "patent applied for" is clearly a violation of 35 U.S.C. § 292:
"(a) Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any unpat-
ented article, the word "patent" or any word or number importing that the same is patented,
for the purposes of deceiving the public: or
Whoever marks upon, or affixes to, or uses in advertising in connection with any article,
the words 'patent applied for,' 'patent pending,' or any other word importing that an applica-
tion for patent has been made, or if made, is not pending, for the purpose of deceiving the
public:
Shall be fined not more than S500.00 for every such offense.
(b) Any person may sue for the penalty, in which event one-half shall go to the personal
suing and the other to the use of the United States.
False representations with regards to trademarks and patents might also come within the
purview of 15 U.S.C. § 1125 of the Lanham Trade-Mark Act. The Act provides:
(a) Any persons who shall affix, apply or annex, or use in connection with any goods or
services, or any container or containers for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false
description or representation, including words or symbols tending falsely to describe or repre-
sent the same, and shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person
who shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of origin or description of represen-
tation cause or procure the same to be transported or used . . shall be liable to a civil action
by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin or in the region in
which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely to be
damaged by the use of any such false description or representation.
(b) Any goods marked or labeled in contravention of the provisions of this section shall
not be imported into the United States. The owner, importer, or consignee of goods refused en-
try at any customhouse under this ection may have recourse by protest or appeal that is given
by this chapter in cases involving goods refused entry or seized.
See generally Florida v. Real Juices, Inc., 370 F. Supp. 428 (D.C., Fla. 1971); Socift6 Com-
ptoir De L' Industrie Cotonniere Establissements Boussac v. Alexander's Dept- Stores, Inc,
299 F.2d 33 (2d Cir. 1962).
Clearly violations under 35 U.S.C. § 292 (1954) and 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1974) might be held
to bear on a determination of an unfair trade act pursuant to Section 337 of the Federal Trade
Act of 1974 Since 15 U.S.C. § 1125 prescribes the same remedy as a temporary or permanent
exclusion order, 19 U.S.C. § 1337 (e), (d), a violation under this section might diminish the
U.S.I.T.C.'s motivation in making a determination pursuant to Section 337. However, 15
U.S.C. § 1125 has seldom been used. See Grimes, Control ofAdvertising in the United States and
Germany - Volkswagen has a Better Idea, 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1774 (1971).
131. In re White Light Distributing Corp., 18 FTC 158 (1934). See In re Ritter Brothers,
Inc., 45 FTC 596 (1949).
132. See note 109, supra.
UNITED STATES INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
U.S.I.T.C's expanding role in regulating unfair methods of competition in
foreign commerce.' 33
IV. SECTION 337 INJURY DETERMINATION
"Unfair methods of competition and unfair acts in the importation of
articles into the United States" are proscribed by Section 337 when their
"effect or tendency ... is to destroy or substantially injure an industry, ef-
ficiently and economically operated, in the United States, or to prevent the
establishment of such an industry..."I"
As is true with several antitrust statutes, 3 ' Section 337 seeks to remedy
anticompetitive practices in their incipiency. The court in In Re Von
Clerm,13 6 defined the injury standard: "[W]here unfair methods and acts
have resulted in conceivable losses of sale, 37 a tendency to substantially in-
133. These allegations were dropped in investigational stages of the proceeding. Also note
that in the early Tariff Commission case of Manila Rope, Section 316, Docket No. 5, April
1927, an unfair trade act was found where imported rope labeled as "manila" or "bolt" rope
also contained other fibers. The Commission issued a final exclusion order.
134. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1974).
135. See Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1973 & Supp. 1977), Clayton
Act of 1914, 15 U.S.C. .§14, 18 (1973).
136. 229 F.2d. 441 (emphasis added) (C.C.P.A. 1955) (Tariff Commission).
137. The Commission also recognized in Chain Door Locks, Investigation No. 337-TA-5,
U.S.I.T.C. Publ. No. 770 (1976), that where a domestic product has become "substantially less
profitable" as a result of the importation of foreign goods in the same line of commerce, a "ten-
dency to substantially injure" an American industry might be established.
An industry's decline in employment, the idling of machinery, and reduced production
may also bear on injury determinations pursuant to Section 337. See Meprobamate P.J., T.C.
Pub. 389, April 1971; Articles Comprised of Plastic Sheets Having an Openwork Structure,
F.I., T.C. Pub. 44, December 1971.
In antidumping inquiries, which arguably may fall within the purview of Section 337, in-
jury determinations have characteristically hinged on several factors: (1) loss of domestic sales;
(2) foreign market penetration; (3) price depression or suppression; (4) increasing domestic in-
ventories or idle capacity; (5) loss of customers; (6) market disruption. Silberger, supra note 95,
at 99 (criteria for Section 337 injury determination "include many of the factors present in
dumping investigations.") See Synthetic Star Sapphires and Rubies, Investigation No. 337-13,
Tariff Comm'n. Publ. (Sept- 1954); affd, In re Von Clemm, supra note 70. See Racing Plates
from Canada, Investigation No. AA-1921-37, Tariff Comm'n. Pub]. 645 (Jan. 1974); Metal
Punching Machines, Single-End Type, Manually Operated, From Japan, Investigation No.
AA-1921-123, Tariff Comm'n. Pub]. 640 (Jan. 1974).
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jure such industry has been established."'3
Under both the Tariff Act of 1930 and the Federal Trade Act of 1974,
the Commission has applied this incipiency standard to injury determina-
tions. Under the former statute, however, the Tariff Commission referred
the injury determination to the President, who then could order exclusion of
the articles from entry at United States customs houses' t3 9 Presently, a
U.S.I.T.C. finding of injury is directly "implemented" by the Commis-
sion,14 pursuant to presidential approval.1
4 1
Unlike such antitrust statutes as the Robinson-Patman Act,14 1 Section
337 of the Federal Trade Act of 1974 does not proscribe injury to competi-
tion. Instead, Section 337 seeks to prevent competitive harm to "an
industry."' 43 In patent cases the domestic industry has long been held to be
the industry legally entitled to manufacture and sell the patented item.
44 If
the patent is licensed to other domestic manufacturers,' 45 they also will be
138. In his brief on behalf of the Tariff Commission in In re Von Clemm, ex-Assistant At-
torney General [now Chief Justice] Warren Burger reasoned that: "The answer to appellant's
contention is that the statute does not require the Commission to wait until the domestic in-
dustry has been wholly destroyed or substantially injured before it takes action. Section 337
authorizes the Commission to act if the unfair methods or acts have a 'tendency' to bring about
the destruction or injury. There can be no doubt that the importation in ever increasing quan-
tities of the offending stones and their sale at prices so low that the domestic product cannot
possibly meet them will eventually bring about a substantial injury to the domestic industry if
indeed it does not cause its entire destruction." [Record at 29, 30.]
In re Certain Electronic Audio and Related Equipment, Investigation No. 337-TA-7,
U.S.I.T.C. Publ. No. 768 (1976), the Commission stated that a Section 337 "tendency to in-
jure" might result where the "undesirable conduct will [might] eventually blossom into a
restraint of trade..."
A "tendency to injure" has also been held to exist where a trade practice "threatens in any
significant way" to impair "the ability of the domestic industry to carry on business. In re
Furazolidone, Investigation No. 337-21, Tariff Comm'n. Publ. 299 (Nov. 1969).
139. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
140. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(d), (e), (f) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
141. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g) (1965 & Supp. 1977) provides: "REFERRAL TO THE PRESI-
DENT - (1) If the Commission determines that there is a violation of this section, or that, for
purposes of subsection (e), there is reason to believe that there is such a violation, it shall - (A)
Publish such determination in the Federal Register, and (B) Transmit to the President a copy of
such determination and the action taken under subsection (d), (e), or (f), [permanent, tem-
porary exclusion order, or cease and desist order] with respect thereto, together with the record
upon which such determination is based. (2) If before the close ofthe 60-day periodbeginning on
the day after the day on which he receives a copy of such determination, the President, for policy
reasons, disapproves such determination and notifies the Commission of his disapproval, then, ef-
fective on the date of such notice, such determination and the action taken under subsection (d), (e),
or (j) of this section with respect thereto shall have no force or effect. (emphasis added).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 13a (1973).
143. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
144. In-the-Ear- Hearing-Aids Tariff Comm'n. Publ. No. 182 (1966). Silberger, supra note
106, at 99.
145. Certain Ultra-Microtome Freezing Attachments, Investigation No. 337-TA-10.
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included within the definition of "industry."' 4 6 With regards to foreign pa-
tents, the "industry" will consist of the domestic licensee.'47
In non-patent cases, "an industry" is considered to be the manufactur-
ing facilities in the United States devoted to the production of the articles in
question."'
Imported goods are held to compete with the domestic industry, when
the foreign product is either identical to the domestic article, 49 or substan-
tially similar (cross-elasticity).5 ° Since its early days as the Tariff Commis-
sion, the U.S.I.T.C. has therefore defined the relevant "line of commerce"
in a fashion similar to the approach taken under other American antitrust
statutes. I I
The Commission has been less conventional in defining the relevant
geographic market under Section 337 of the Federal Trade Act of 1974.
Historically, the geographic scope of a Section 337 "injury to an industry"
determination has been held to be the entire national output of the product
in question.' 2 In more recent years, however, the Commission has
regionalized injury determinations to relevant geographic markets within
the United States.1
5 3
In some investigations the U.S.I.T.C. has gone so far in regionalizing
relevant geographic markets in the United States that Section 337 injury
146. Id. See Self-Closing Containers, Investigation No. 337-18, Tariff Comm'n. Publ. 55
(Apr. 1962); In-the-Ear-Hearing Aids, Tariff Comm'n. Publ. No. 182 (1966).
147. See Push Button Puppets, Tariff Comm'n. Publ. Notice of Oct. 31, 1958.
148. See Wrenches, Pliers, Screwdrivers and Metal Cutting Snips and Shears from Japan,
Investigation No. 1921-141, Tariff Comm'n. Pub. 696 (Oct. 1974) (antidumping inquiry).
149. See Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 9782 (Tariff Comm'n. 1960).
150. See Nepheline Syenite from Canada, 26 Fed. Reg. 956 (Tariff Comm'n. 1961) (cross-
elasticity found between Canadian nepheline syenite and American feldspar, both used in the
production of glass).
15 1. See generally A. C. Coudert, The Application of the United States Antidumping Law in
the Light of a Liberal Trade Policy, 65 Colum. L. Rev. 189 (1965).
152. See Titanium Dioxide from France, 28 Fed. Reg. 10467, 10468 (Tariff Conm'n.
1963); Hot-Rolled Carbon Steel Wire Rods from France, 28 Fed. Reg. 7368 (Tariff Comm'n.
1963); Bicycles from Czechoslovakia, 25 Fed. Reg. 9782 (Tariff Comm'n. 1960).
153. See Orlowitz v. United States, 200 F. Supp. 302 (Cust. Ct. 1961) (Customs Court en-
dorsed Tariff Commission's "regionalizing" of cast-iron soil pipe industry to comprise six pipe
producers in California; antidumping action). See generally Chromic Acid from Australia, 29
Fed, Reg. 2919 (Tariff Comm'n. 1964) (antidumping action); Portland Cement from
Dominican Republic, 128 Fed. Reg. 4047 (Tariff Comm'n.) (1963) (antidumping action).
Although these three cases represent antidumping inquiries, the "injury to an industry"
criteria for dumping may bear on Section 337 investigations. Silberger, supra note 106, at 99.
The Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § 160 uses the equivalent language of Section 337 with
regards to injury determinations: ". . . and the Commission shall determine within three
months thereafter whether an industry in the United States is being or is likely to be injured or is
prevented from being established...'" (emphasis added.)
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determinations have been criticized as going beyond injury to an industry, to
hold that competitive harm to a domestic competitor(s) is enough.
5 4
A Section 337 determination of injury to an industry can only result if
the domestic industry is "efficiently and economically operated." This re-
quisite to a Section 337 claim of unfair competition is unique to the Federal
Trade Act of 1974. A similar provision is not found in Section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act, Section 337's counterpart.
Although a U.S.I.T.C. complainant must show that its industry is "ef-
ficiently and economically operated" before the Commission may rule on an
alleged unfair trade practice,
[riecent cases generally have not belabored this requirement,
perhaps because the presence of a potential product subject to im-
port competition has been deemed at least to illustrate that some
technological advances have been achieved - or employed - by
the complainant."'
However, in Electronic Pianos15 6 the Commission found the domestic
industry to be efficiently and economically operated using three evidentiary
bases: (1) The consolidation of complainant's manufacturing facilities con-
tributing to its modernity and efficiency of operation; (2) complainant's use
of management consultants to improve the efficiency of its manufacturing
process; and (3) complainant's implementation of an incentive labor
program, which had a heightened impact on labor performance.
In Chain Door Locks' the Commission held the advanced automation
of the domestic industry's production process sufficient to meet the
"efficiently and economically operated" requirement.
The findings of fact in support of the presiding officer's recommended
determination in Reclosable Plastic Bags' represent the most complete dis-
cussion of the relevant criteria in showing a domestic industry "efficiently
and economically operated." Such factors include: (1) An upward trend in
domestic sales of United States produced products; (2) an upward trend in
export sales of United States produced products; (3) increased output of
United States products; (4) increased labor production force within
154. See generally Northern Bleached Hardwood Kraft Pulp from Canada, 38 Fed. Reg.
87 (TariffComm'n. 1973); Instant Potato Granules from Canada, 37 Fed. Reg. 18, 505 (Tariff
Comm'n. 1972). See also Swimming Pool Case, supra note 19; Chicory Root, supra note 29;
Solder Removing Wicks, Investigation No. 337-TA-26 (U.S.I.T.C. investigations where com-
plaints have focused on injury to a competitor in an otherwise concentrated market).
155. Silberger, supra note 106, at 100.
156. Investigation No. 337-TA-31.
157. Investigation No. 337-TA-15, U.S.I.T.C. Publ. No. 770 (1976).
158. Investigation No. 337-TA-22.
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domestic industry; (5) average annual man hours per production of
domestically produced goods; (6) output per man hour for the domestic
industry over the past five years; (7) a stipulation by the parties to an in-
vestigation that the complainant is an efficiently and economically operated
industry; (8) expansion of production facilities; (9) square footage of
production plant; (10) net sales, net operating profit (or loss), and ratio of
net operating profit (or loss) to net sales for total company operations and
for operations of domestically produced product; (11) net sales, manufac-
turing expenses, and ratio of manufacturing expenses to net sales for total
company operations and for operations of domestically produced product;
(12) efficiency in manufacturing process, i.e., improvement of facilities, ad-
ministration, process, etc.; (13) steps taken to increase volume of sales, ef-
forts in advertising, direct mail, product promotion, and direct sales to
potential buyers; (14) patentee and licensee exchange of technology pur-
suant to licensing and franchising agreements; and (15) profit and loss data
of licensees.
To date, the Commission has not definitively ruled which, if any, of
these criteria are crucial to a finding that a domestic industry is "efficiently
and economically operated." The efficacy of a Section 337 respondent
defending solely on grounds that the complainant is not -efficiently and
economically operated" is therefore suspect.
Although an injury determination pursuant to Section 337 may result
when an alleged unfair trade practice has "the effect or tendency . ..to
destroy or substantially injure an industry efficiently and economically
operated . . ." the statute also seeks to prohibit restraints of trade which
"prevent the establishment of [such] an industry."ls 9 A similar standard is
found in the Antidumping Act of 1921,110 Under both statutes this criterion
for injury is seldom, if ever, alleged.
In Certain Regenerative Blower/PuMpsW6' the Commission considered
the "prevention of an industry" standard as one of first impression. The
Commission majority held that an industry which was already established
could not be prevented from being established. A different interpretation of
the injury standard was proffered by the dissent:
[lI]f an industry has made a commitment, and if it has the
capability of becoming established, the requirement of the An-
tidumping Act is satisfied if LTFV sales frustrate or forestall the
development of a stable and viable U.S. industry. 62
159. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
160. 19 U.S.C. § 160(a) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
161. Investigation No. AA-1921-140, Tariff Comm'n. Pub]. 676 (May 1974) (hereinafter
Regenerative Blower/Pumps).
162. Id.
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In Certain Ultra-Microtome Freezing Attachments, 163 the Commission
adopted the minority view in Regenerative Blower/Pumps by broadening the
injury standard to include two classes of parties:
(I) [P]arties which have just begun manufacturing operations
and for which section 337 violations would have the effect or ten-
dency of frustrating efforts to stabilize such operations;
(2) [Pjarties which are about to commence production and for
which section 337 violations would have the effect or tendency of
frustrating efforts to found a business.'64
In general, the Commission held that parties seeking redress "under the
prevention clause of Section 337 must show a readiness to commence
production." 6 However, where "patent infringement forms the basis of the
complaint, ownership of, or license to produce under the patent is not in it-
self a sufficient showing of such readiness for a remedy to issue." Policy con-
siderations dictate that a remedy could not issue in such a situation, because
Commission action "might remove all incentive to establish a domestic
industry."' 66 Beyond Regenerative Blower/Pumps and Freezing Attach-
ments, little additional analysis concerning the "prevention of an industry"
standard has been forthcoming from the Commission."7
V. REMEDIES UNDER SECTION 337
OF THE FEDERAL TRADE ACT OF 1974.
A. The Temporary Exclusion Order
Subsection (e) of Section 337 grants temporary relief:
[11f, during the course of an investigation under this section, the
Commission determines that there is reason to believe that there is
a violation of this section, it may direct that the articles concerned
. ..be excluded from entry into the United States, unless, after
considering the effect of such exclusion upon the public health and
welfare, competitive conditions in the United States economy, the
production of like or directly competitive articles in the United
States, and the United States consumers, it finds that such articles
should not be excluded from entry . . . except that such articles
shall be entitled to entry under bond determined by the Commis-
sion and prescribed by the Secretary [of the Treasury],
68
163. Investigation No. 337-TA-10 (Commission Memorandum Opinion) (hereinafter
Freezing A ttachments .
164. id. at 10.
165. Id.
166. Id. at I1.
167. See Silberger, supra note 106, at 100.
168. 19. U.S.C. § 1337(e) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
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Subsection (f)'69 of Section 337 offers an additional means of tem-
porary relief through the issuance of a cease and desist order, "unless after
taking into account the same public interest factors as enumerated in Sub-
section (e) it finds that such order should not be issued."' 70
Subsections (e) and (f) of Section 337 require the Commission to make
three determinations before it can issue temporary relief.'' The Commis-
sion must find that:
(1) There is a reason to believe that there is a violation of Section 337;
(2) there is a need for temporary relief; and
(3) the public interest factors do not outweigh the need for temporary
relief.'172
The "reason to believe" standard of finding (1) involves determining that
"there is an unfair method of competition or unfair act, and also finding a
reason to believe that there is the requisite effect or tendency as a result of
such unfair practice." " "Failure of the Commission to determine that there
is reason to believe that there is a violation of Section 337 would, of course,
render unnecessary the need to consider whether there should be temporary
relief and whether the public interest factors would outweigh the need for
such temporary relief."' 74
Because temporary relief was designed to prevent possible further in-
jury to a domestic industry pending a final U.S.!.T.C. determination,
complainants in Section 337 proceedings have argued that the "reason to
believe" standard is less strict than a finding of tendency to injure pursuant
to Subsections (d) and (f) regarding "final" remedies. Past precedent under
an equivalent section of the Tariff Act of 1930'11 establishes that the "Com-
mission interpreted 'reason to believe' to require a showing of the existence
of a 'prima facie' violation." 76 The Commission Memorandum Opinion in
Chicory Root states:
In other words, the Commission at least in later cases under the
old provision, did not make a finding of reason to believe the
statute was being violated until after seeking and considering
responses, defenses, and information from alleged violators and
169. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
170. Chicory Root, supra note 29. (Commission Memorandum Opinion)
171. 19 C.FR, § 210.41(e)(2), Chapter II, provides that all temporary relief hearings".
shall be completed within three (3) months after publication in the Federal Register of the
notice instituting the investigation."
172. Chicory Root. supra note 29.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(0 (1965 & Supp. 1977).
176. Chicory Root. supra note 29. (Commission Memorandum Opinion)
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interested parties weighing the information before it, and deter-
mining that there was a preponderance of the information on the
side of complainant for each element necessary for showing there
to be a violation and regarding each proper defense, though the in-
formation available did not satisfy it that there was a violation. 7
The amendments to Section 337 made by the Tariff Act of 1974
which established the present "reason to believe" language did
not, it appears, intend to disturb the meaning given to such phrase
by the Commission under the prior provision. The addition of new
Section 337(c)(1) requires the Commission to consider equitable
and legal defenses and to hold a hearing that conforms with the re-
quirements of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) prior to
directing temporary relief. The new requirements thus are consis-
tent with the Commission practice of weighing all the evidence
before it and determining where the weight of the evidence lies
before deciding that temporary relief is warranted. '78
... .It is our view that the basic standard actually used by the
Commission under the prior provisions . . . that of probability of
a violation, or alternatively stated, preponderance of the evidence
. ..is still applicable to temporary relief proceedings. 7 9
Although the standard for temporary relief might seem less strict than
what otherwise is required for relief pursuant to a final injury determina-
tion, in practice temporary exclusion orders and/or cease and desist orders
are every bit as difficult to obtain as final remedies.' In light of the policy
behind temporary relief, that is, to eliminate the potential for harm to
U.S.I.T.C. complainants (domestic industry) pending a final Commission
determination, it would appear that a motion for temporary relief pursuant
to Subsections (e) and (f) merely accelerates the time-schedule for Section
337 determinations. A motion for temporary relief therefore puts an added
burden on all parties to the proceeding by creating the necessity for two full-
blown administrative hearings, instead of one. It also makes the twelve
month time limit (eighteen months in more complicated cases) of Subsection
(b)(1) more difficult to meet.' 8' Accordingly, many practitioners feel that the
strict burden of proof required for Subsections (e) and (f) temporary relief
was fashioned to dissuade litigants from seeking this remedy.
The confusion over the injury standard in Section 337 temporary relief




180. Subsequent to the enactment of the Federal Trade Act of 1974, the Commission
found "injury" in a non-patent based Section 337 investigation only once. See Commission
Memorandum Opinion in Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube, supra note 18.
181. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(b)(1) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
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the primafacie one would be one which more closely approximates the court
test of whether or not to issue a preliminary injunction, i.e., probability of
success on the merits."" 2 Whether this standard would make it easier for
Section 337 complainants to obtain temporary relief, without putting an in-
creased burden on the Commission to meet its statutory time limit, is pure
conjecture. Since temporary relief pursuant to Secion 337(e) permits
bonded entry of the imported goods in an "amount which would offset any
competitive or unfair act enjoyed by persons benefiting from the importa-
tion of the article,"' 83 perhaps a lower injury standard for temporary relief
determinations is warranted.
B. Permanent Exclusion Orders'
8 '
(d) EXCLUSION OF ARTICLES FROM ENTRY. - If the
Commission determines, as a result of an investigation under this
section, that there is a violation of this section, it shall direct that
the articles concerned, imported by any person violating the provi-
sion of this section, be excluded from entry into the United States,
unless, after considering the effect of such exclusion upon the
public health and welfare, competitive conditions in the United
States economy, the production of like or directly competitive arti-
cles in the United States, and United States consumers, it finds
that such articles should not be excluded from entry. The Com-
mission shall notify the Secretary of the Treasury of its action un-
der this subsection directing such exclusion from entry, and upon
receipt of such notice, the Secretary shall, through the proper of-
ficers, refuse such entry.'
Exclusion of imported articles pursuant to Subsection (d) are in the nature
of in rem proceedings. 1 6 Upon a Commission decision to issue a permanent
exclusion order, entry may be permitted under bond, pending the sixty day
period awaiting Presidential approval rendering the determination final., 7
To date, the Commission has yet to issue a permanent exclusion order in a
non-patent based Section 337 proceeding under the new Federal Trade Act
of 1974.
C. Cease and Desist Orders'
182. Kaye Plaia, Revitalization of Unfair Trade Causes in the Importation of Goods: an
Analysis of the Amendments to Section 337, 57 J. Pat. Off. Soc'y. 208, 270 (1975)
183. See note 24, supra.
184. 190 U.S.C. § 1337(d) (Supp. 1977).
185. Id. See 19 C.F.R. § 210.41, Chapter 11 (hearing for permanent relief).
186. See text accompanying notes 8-45 supra.
187. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(3) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
188. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(f) (1965 & Supp. 1977).
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Section 337, Subsection (f) states:
(f) CEASE AND DESIST ORDERS. - In lieu of taking ac-
tion under subsection (d) or (e), the Commission may issue and
cause to be served on any person violating this section, or believed
to be violating this section, as the case may be, an order directing
such person to cease and desist from engaging in the unfair
methods or acts involved, unless after considering the effect of
such order upon the public health and welfare, competitive condi-
tions in the United States economy, the production of like or direc-
tly competitive articles in the United States, and United States
consumers, it finds that such order should not be issued. The Com-
mission may at any time, upon such notice and in such manner as
it deems proper, modify or revoke any such order, and, in the case
of a revocation, may take action under subsection (d) or (e), as the
case may be.''
Unlike the temporary or permanent exclusion order, a Section 337 cease and
desist order is an in personam remedy. The issuance of a cease and desist or-
der by the Commission against a foreign manufacturer would require his
presence at a U.S.I.T.C. investigation. 9 " As is true with exclusion orders,
entry of the imported goods "shall be entitled to entry under bond ..
pending Presidential approval of the Commission's determination. 9 '
VI. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE ROLE OF THE U.S.I.T.C.
IN SECTION 337 PROCEEDINGS.
On January 15, 1976, American television manufacturers filed a Section
337 complaint before the Commission alleging unfair trade practices by cer-
tain Japanese television importers and manufacturers.' 92 In terms of pure
dollar amount, the television case has been termed the largest U.S.I.T.C. in-
vestigation to date. This investigation may represent the first in a series of
large-scale Section 337 cases to be brought before the Commission."9 3 As
foreign imports have entered the stream of American commerce in ever in-
creasing quantities, several key United States industries have suffered
serious losses in sales. A corresponding decrease in production has laid off
thousands of workers. In the American shoe industry alone, over the last fif-
teen years the number of domestic operations has dropped from a high of
one thousand to a present low of three hundred and fifty."' Twenty-six
189. Id.
190. See text accompany notes 8-45 supra.
191. 19 U.S.C. § 1337(g)(3).
192. See Color Television Case, supra note 29.
193. See also Stainless Steel Pipe and Tube. supra note 18.
194. Free Trade or "Protection": A Hot Potato For Carter. U.S. News & World Rep., Feb.
14, 1977, at 66-67.
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thousand leather workers have lost their jobs. 9 Notwithstanding the
American shoe and television industry, large in-roads have been made by
foreign manufacturers as well in the United States audio and electronics,
textiles, automobile, and iron and steel industries. 9 6 Domestic manufac-
turers and labor unions are lobbying hard for a protectionist stance by
United States judicial institutions and agencies,
Despite the clamor among several United States industries and labor
unions for increased protection against foreign imports, the reality is that
the U.S.I.T.C. has only recently found injury to a domestic industry in a
non-patent based Section 337 inquiry under the Federal Trade Act of 1974.
The Commission is understandably concerned that its past failure to hold
for the domestic industry in non-patent based U.S.I.T.C. Section 337 in-
vestigations has diminished its viability as an antitrust regulatory agency.
195. Id.
196. Id. See U.S. Dep't of Comm., Commerce America, Vol. 11, No. 4, at 16 (1977) for an
accounting of the recent increase in major U.S. imports:
MAJOR U.S. IMPORTS
(f.a.s. transaction values in millions of dollars)
1974 1975 1976
Import total 100,251 96,116 120,677
Industrial supplies, total 51,306 48,820 60,902
Petroleum, total 24,668 25,197 32,226
Crude oil 15,332 18,374 25,480
Chemicals 4,018 3,696 4,772
Iron and steel-mill products 4,756 4,037 3,809
Nonferrous metals 3,922 2,581 3,501
Newsprint 1,503 1,427 1,742
Lumber 1,141 866 1,452
Consumer goods, total 25,260 24,081 32,503
Passenger cars
From Canada 2,626 2,803 3,477
From other countries 4,673 4,321 5,451
Automotive parts
and engines
From Canada 1,023 1,045 1,560
From other countries 476 428 533
Clothing 2,331 2,562 3,634
Consumer electronics 2,354 1,985 3,242
Footwear 1,134 1,275 1,686
Capital goods, total 10,754 10,857 13,007
Machinery 8,666 9,007 10,540
Trucks 515 489 695
Foods, feeds,
beverages, total 10,570 9,645 11,549
Coffee 1,505 1,561 2,632
Fish 1,500 1,356 1,855
Meat 1,353 1,141 1,447
Sugar 2,247 1,865 1,154
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However, the U.S.I.T.C. is aware that increased efficiencies by foreign
manufacturers and the corresponding benefit which lower prices for imports
bestow upon the American consumer, have necessitated Commis-
sion "no-injury" determinations in past non-patent based cases. Whether
the U.S.I.T.C. is to become a full-fledged antitrust regulatory agency in the
style of the FTC must not depend on its becoming the lackey of American
industry, but instead on an even-handed and rational decision-making
process in Section 337 investigations. To date, the Commission has not com-
promised these high standards.
